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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This report examines media bias as it relates to international news 
coverage and more specifically the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. The report 
gathers data from existing sources and supplements it with that from newly 
carried out focus groups in Yerevan and Baku to add depth and clarity to 
what already exists. 
 
The report finds that in the capital cities of both countries, there is 
generally a high demand for an independent and unbiased media. 
However, in the case of Nagorno Karabakh conflict, residents of Yerevan 
and Baku hold conflicting views on media freedom and consider that 
unbiased reporting on the conflict is problematic.  
 
• Many Armenians are concerned that freer reporting on Nagorno 
Karabakh is a threat to national security and many journalists 
practice self-censorship when writing about the conflict. 
• Azerbaijanis worry that normal coverage of Nagorno Karabakh will 
result in the younger generation forgetting about its significance. 
Instead, they believe that the news should serve to incite hatred and 
the need for retribution against Armenians. 
 
Worrying comments about the decline of interest in local television news 
and increased reliance on foreign sources in the capitals of both Armenia 
and Azerbaijan also indicate a troubling level of citizen disengagement. 
Moreover, such disconnection may foreshadow a larger scale decline in 
the importance of national media coverage of current affairs if topics of 
interest and concern are not titrated with consumer demands. 
 
• Residents of Yerevan believe that all the main television stations 
are controlled by the government and copy news directly from other 
sources while also manipulating stories in order to present an 
unrealistic picture of current events to the public. 
• Residents of Baku feel that the television environment is polarized 
between opposition and government channels. While they also feel 
that coverage is copied from other news services, they believe the 
government channels generally avoid covering news and instead 
focus on non-controversial topics such as sports and beauty. 
 
As a result of its findings the report recommends  
 
• That the donor community should focus efforts aimed at 
strengthening the media on new technologies that rely less on 
governmental control and on providing the necessary infrastructure 
and education for the entire population of Armenia and Azerbaijan – 
not just the elites in the capital – to access these technologies. 
• Journalists and donors should work together to create a more self-
sustaining culture of journalist integrity which focuses on the 
creation of an ethical community of practice rather than legislating 
to control norms of journalistic behavior. 
• Partners with the Armenian and Azerbaijani governments in the 
NGO and donor community need to continually stress to those 
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promoting biased media in both countries that accurate reporting 
can actually be in the national interest. The point should be made 
that objective reporting not only improves domestic stability, but is 
also in the long-term security and geopolitical interest of both 
countries. 
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INTRODUCTION 
While the media can amplify existing tensions and reinforce differences, it 
also has the potential to build confidence across existing fracture lines by 
covering a wider spectrum of issues, diversifying sources, representing 
more voices than just the elite, and consciously eliminating bias from 
coverage. Monitoring results of media sources in Armenia and Azerbaijan 
document how inaccuracies in articles published by the  leading 
newspapers in both countries “don’t add any new or necessary 
information, but rather [they] set a negative context in the public 
consciousness, which hinders dialogue and mutual understanding.”1 
Without more accurate and unbiased information about the other free of 
negative rhetoric and stereotypes, Armenians and Azerbaijanis will 
continue to see themselves as enemies without any common ground.  
 
Therefore, EPF has initiated the Unbiased Media Coverage of Armenia-
Azerbaijan Relations program to increase the amount of accurate and 
unbiased reporting on bilateral relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan 
as well as on the Nagorno Karabakh conflict itself. The program aims to 
foster a cooperative network of editors, journalists and media NGOs from 
both countries.  
 
It also takes into consideration the perception that “objective” reporting can 
be elusive for many mass media outlets throughout the world, some of 
which equate objective reporting with boring reporting. Journalists must 
produce a compelling product that sells, and the result can be that some 
issues are highly sensationalized. Theoretical questions about whether 
journalists can ever be truly objective also arise, so rather than aim for 
objective reporting on bilateral issues, the program seeks to address the 
issues of inaccuracy and bias as well as ethical and conflict-sensitive 
journalism – concepts that are more palatable to those whose final goal is 
to sell a product.  
 
In order to better understand how those who consume the media perceive 
the current state of journalism, and to provide a modicum of baseline data, 
CRRC has carried out eight focus groups – four in Yerevan and four in 
Baku (for more information see APPENDIX 1). While several surveys have 
been conducted in Armenia and Azerbaijan on the level of public trust in 
the media as well as perceptions of bias, none delve much deeper than 
what is reported above or provide an overview of the extant literature on 
such matters. The following report is the result of focus groups and desk 
research conducted by CRRC to provide a preliminary assessment of 
public attitudes towards the media, especially regarding relations between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
 
No doubt this report, like any other, suffers limitations. The relatively small 
number of focus groups were conducted only in the capital cities of 
                                             
1 Yerevan Press Club, Yeni Nesil Journalists Union of Azerbaijan & Black Sea Press 
Association (2005). What Can a Word Do?: Materials of Armenian, Azerbaijani and 
Georgian Press Analysis. Retrieved September 20, 2008 from  
http://www.ypc.am/eng/?go=act/studies 
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Armenia and Azerbaijan and focused on individuals who actively consume 
news on politics and current affairs. However, this report seeks to 
substantiate all claims made by participants of the focus groups by 
including reference to other studies conducted in Azerbaijan and Armenia 
as well as expert interviews with media professionals in both countries as 
well as Turkey. 
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OVERVIEW 
Many academics argue that the influence of the media is stronger in 
environments where alternative sources of information are limited. Some 
also posit that media affect is especially acute in environments where 
citizens depend on a limited number of media sources. In contrast, when 
citizens have alternative sources of information they are less subject to the 
potential effects of the media.2 According to CRRC’s Data Initiative, 67 
percent of respondents in Armenia and 79 percent in Azerbaijan rely on TV 
as their main source of information about national politics.3 Other studies 
conducted in Armenia also suggest that while the number of media outlets 
is relatively high, they do not provide alternative political views.4 The same 
is true in Azerbaijan. 
 
Moreover, some scholars argue that the media has more influence on 
those individuals with little interest or involvement in politics. Citizens who 
are well-informed and politically active have deeply rooted attitudes and 
are less likely to change their opinion based on new information. 5 At the 
same time, those who are less knowledgeable and interested in politics 
are unlikely to be exposed to potentially biased messages disseminated by 
the media. Thus, those with a moderate interest and involvement in politics 
are the subgroup of the population most susceptible to media influence.6  
 
According to CRRC’s Data Initiative, the percentage of those who are very 
interested in politics, i.e. showing acute interest and most likely to have 
deeply rooted views, is not large in Armenia or Azerbaijan. Indeed, the 
majority fall into the category of people who, according to the theoretical 
framework discussed above, are most susceptible to media influence. 
Those who are either hardly interested or quite interested compose 55 
percent of the population in Azerbaijan and 60 percent in Armenia. Thus, 
according to the argument, it is this group of people who are most 
vulnerable to media influence.  
 
A powerful counter argument to the more conventionally held view of 
media development also exists. A distinct group of scholars, who take a 
more psychological approach to the problem, argue that misinformation is 
not simply the result of media bias, but rather due to individuals accepting 
various messages according to already extant perceptions. The argument 
                                             
2 Mughan, A. eds (2002). Democracy and the Media: A Comparative Perspective, 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
3 CRRC Data Initiative 2007 
4 OSCE/ODHIR Election Observation Mission (30 May, 2008). Republic of Armenia 
Presidential Elections 19 February, 2008. Warsaw. Retrieved 23 September, 2008, 
from http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2008/05/31397_en.pdf 
5 Mughan, A. eds (2002). Democracy and the Media: A Comparative Perspective, 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
6 Ibid. 
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is that individuals susceptible to being influenced are therefore inclined to 
“biased processing.”7  
 
This study suggests that in the case of Armenia the two positions are not 
contradictory. Better informed and politically involved individuals are likely 
to have prior knowledge of the subject  and are more selective in choosing 
media sources, often seeking out what they perceive to be the most 
objective information available. As the psychological theory posits, these 
people are often inclined to consider their existing attitudes and beliefs to 
be true and filter the news through this lens. Thus, they accept messages 
in order to maintain their original perceptions.  
 
That is not to say that those who argue media bias influences public 
opinion are incorrect, even among serious consumers of the media. 
Indeed, the two sets or arguments are not mutually exclusive. The focus 
groups provide stark evidence that bias in the local media creates high 
levels of cynicism, apathy towards political involvement, and distrust of the 
government. It also pushes elites away from accessing the local media 
and serves as a means to fuel and perpetuate hatred. This is a role the 
media has and continues to play with regards to the conflict over Nagorno 
Karabakh. 
 
However, the focus groups shed light on how an unbiased media could 
satisfy consumer demand for accurate information about the conflict. 
Indeed, the manner in which information is provided will play a significant 
role in the public’s understanding of Nagorno Karabakh, with both 
countries in dire need of a media strategy that can appeals to populations 
where ethnic solidarity and support of governmental positions on the 
conflict are the norm. Recommendations for such a strategy, as well as a 
broader one for the local media to provide better international coverage, 
are given at the end of this report.  
                                             
7 Lee, R., Lepper, M and Hubbard M. (1975). “Perseverance in Self-perception and 
Social Perceptions: Biased Attributional Processes in the Debriefing Paradigm”. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 32:880-92. 
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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
The focus groups carried out by CRRC and supported by other studies 
conducted in both Armenia and Azerbaijan reveal remarkable similarities in 
the situation of freedom of expression and the independence of the mass 
media in both countries. Indeed, a plethora of quotes and statements from 
focus group participants are mutually exchangeable and would not seem 
out of context in either country. 
 
Research continues to indicate that a variety of political viewpoints are not 
represented in the media despite the considerable number of outlets in 
both countries. In Armenia, the media is homogenous, and journalists 
practice self-censorship in order to avoid trouble with the government. In 
Azerbaijan, the situation is similar with the exception of a small but vocal 
print media which attempts to provide alternative information even though 
dissenting journalists presenting viewpoints contradicting or opposing the 
government are often persecuted by the authorities. Focus group 
participants support the conclusions of these studies. 
 
Considering that the media is generally state-controlled in both countries, 
the national media was perceived to be biased by focus group participants. 
However, focus group participants in Armenia were more concerned with 
bias in the media than in Azerbaijan. One possible explanation for this is 
that Armenians are more interested in national and international politics 
than Azerbaijanis. In Armenia, 51 percent of the population is either 
somewhat or very interested in national politics whereas this stands at only 
33 percent in Azerbaijan.8 A second reason for less concern with media 
bias in Azerbaijan could simply be because there is a lack of news on 
sensitive topics. As focus group participants noted, show business and 
other less controversial news tends to dominate content. A third factor that 
could have influenced concerns in Armenia is the 19 February 2008 
presidential election when government restrictions were placed not only on 
the print and broadcast media, but also on Internet-based news sources.9  
 
Indeed, as supported by the focus groups and argued elsewhere, 
presidential elections in Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2003 and 2008 
respectively have resulted in yet another setback for the media in both 
countries. Studies on the aftermath of those elections reveal that the rights 
of journalists were violated in both and greater restrictions were placed on 
the independent media. Some studies suggest that this reaction from the 
authorities could be driven by the fear of the significant role the free 
dissemination of information played in ”colored revolutions” in Georgia and 
Ukraine in 2003 and 2004.10 Therefore, the regimes in both countries 
                                             
8 CRRC Data Initiative 2007 
9 As of the writing of this report the Azerbaijani presidential elections of November 
2008 were still over a month away. The reaction to these elections by the 
Azerbaijani authorities will be interesting to compare with Armenia as they relate 
to the media. 
10 Amnesty International (2007). Azerbaijan: The Contracting Space for Freedom 
of Expression. 2007. Retrieved 24 September, 2008, from 
http://www.amnesty.org.ru/library/Index/ENGEUR550032007?open&of=ENG-AZE  
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attempts to control the flow of information in order to avoid opposing views 
disseminated by the press potentially mobilizing the masses against them.  
 
Despite likely government trepidation in both Armenia and Azerbaijan 
about attempts to enact regime change, the majority of focus group 
participants in both countries perceived the media in Georgia to be freer 
and less biased. This could be explained by the significant strides the 
country has made in terms of liberalizing society despite the large number 
of unresolved problems which still exist in its media, and particularly 
television. Also contributing to perceptions that the situation in Georgia is 
better might be the generally neutral and sometimes positive coverage it 
receives in both countries.11 In contrast, Armenian and Azerbaijani news 
about the other is generally negative and serves to reinforce and deepen 
mutual prejudices in both societies. Interestingly, some participants in 
Azerbaijan perceived the media in Armenia to be freer than their own. 
However, all focus group participants in Armenia had negative perceptions 
about media freedom in Azerbaijan.  
 
Nevertheless, there was still a general interest in receiving more news 
from the other side. Focus group participants in Armenia and Azerbaijan 
thought they should be better informed about the “enemy” and were 
interested in each other’s political and economic situation. However, this 
interest was only expressed after probing from the moderators. The 
reluctance to broach this topic should be more thoroughly explored to 
gauge whether it is related to self-censorship or the general lack of focus 
on the conflict by the media consuming public. 
 
Participants in both countries expressed concerns that Nagorno Karabakh 
is not covered enough in the news and complained about the general lack 
of information on processes happening there. However, the reasons for 
this concern were different. In Armenia, participants were concerned that 
there is a growing gap between Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh, whereas 
in Azerbaijan, they were more interested in anti-Armenian propaganda 
rather than unbiased news. Keeping the memory of the conflict and 
territories occupied by Armenia alive among a younger generation of 
Azerbaijanis would encourage animosity toward Armenians, they argued.  
 
In both countries, focus group participants trusted official state information 
for news on Nagorno Karabakh rather than other sources. As discussed in 
further detail in the country sections of this report, this could be explained 
by the fact that both populations generally accept the official line on the 
conflict because Nagorno Karabakh is considered an issue of significant 
importance. As some focus group participants in Armenia mentioned, the 
government is aware of what information is most suitable to present to the 
public, and what can be harmful for national security.  
 
                                             
11 Yerevan Press Club, Yeni Nesil Journalists Union of Azerbaijan & Black Sea Press 
Association (2005). What Can a Word Do?: Materials of Armenian, Azerbaijani and 
Georgian Press Analysis. Retrieved September 20, 2008, from  
http://www.ypc.am/eng/?go=act/studies  
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Overall, participants in Armenia were generally more tolerant toward 
Azerbaijanis than vice-versa. However, there was some concern that the 
media does fuel hatred towards Azerbaijanis by representing them badly. 
In Azerbaijan, participants were more concerned that Armenians are not 
represented in the media badly enough and that journalists are not 
carrying out the role of fueling hatred among the younger generation.  
 
CRRC’s Data Initiative data also shows that Armenians are more tolerant 
towards Azerbaijanis. (See Chart 1 and Chart 2) This could be explained 
by the fact that Armenia won the war, the small size of the country, and the 
historical inclination for Armenians to engage in business activities with 
other countries. This probably also explains the relatively high percentage 
of Armenians who are interested in engaging in business with Turks12.  
           
      
Chart 1 
Azerbaijan: Attitude toward Neighbors (CRRC DI 2007)
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12 Further probing of both these questions would be fascinating, but remain 
outside the scope of this report.  
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Chart 2 
Armenia: Attitude toward Neighbors (CRRC DI 2007)
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Despite the lack of trust in the mass media, and especially the broadcast 
media, it still remains the main source for informing public opinion in both 
countries.  
 
Returning to our original argument in the introduction, it appears that the 
media has the potential to provide better information and to influence 
opinion in both Armenia and Azerbaijan. This is particularly true in areas 
where information does not exist or where it is discounted out of hand as 
false because the population does not trust the media. 
 
However, entrenched opinion, regardless of the type of news coverage, 
should not be taken for granted. As shown clearly from the focus groups, 
more unbiased and professional coverage could form the basis for 
communication between Azerbaijanis and Armenians, although the 
cognitive lenses through which both view the other and the Nagorno 
Karabakh conflict will require much more than merely better news 
coverage in order to change.  
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ARMENIA 
Section 1 Media Outlets 
A relatively high number of media outlets, both state and private, exist in 
Armenia with four non-cable TV stations broadcasting nationally. In total, 
however, there are 57 publicly available channels broadcast in the country 
although the audience for nearly half of them is limited to Yerevan. 
Numerous radio channels also exist, but their role is limited to 
entertainment with the only exception being the re-broadcasts of Radio 
Liberty on public radio.13  
 
Despite the large number of media outlets, as a number of studies show, 
the Armenian airwaves do not present alternative political opinions to 
consumers.14 Furthermore, journalistic investigation, commentary and 
analysis, and particularly that available on television, is not easily 
consumed by the general public. As one female participant of the focus 
group noted:  
 
“There are enough media outlets, but the competition is 
not for gaining the trust of the public, but rather to gain the 
confidence of the top of the pyramid: whom to praise 
more to be better financed, to have more films and 
programs. They should work for their audience.” (Female, 
18-40, Armenia)   
 
While a small part of the population has started to rely on the Internet for 
information in the capital and other urban areas, the situation differs in the 
regions where the broadcast media is sometimes limited to Public TV as  
the only source of information. The dilemma is that although the public 
does not generally trust the national media, they have to rely on it as the 
main source of information as no alternative exists.  
 
The homogeneity in perceptions of the media in combination with a higher 
level of political engagement compared to Azerbaijan probably explains 
why trust in the media is the lowest in Armenia among the three South 
Caucasus countries.15 Only 25 percent of respondents in Armenia either 
fully trust or somewhat trust the media. 
 
“The whole world is biased. He who pays the piper calls 
the tune. The mass media supports those who have 
money and power, and not only in Armenia.  In America 
there is American bias...” (Male, 18-40, Armenia) 
 
“For those who pay more, their order will be carried out.” 
(Female, 40+, Armenia) 
 
                                             
13 OSCE (2006). The State of Media Freedom in Armenia: Observations and 
Recommendations. Retrieved 23 September, 2008 from 
http://www.osce.org/documents/oy/2007/05/24699_en.pdf. 
14 OSCE/ODHIR Election Observation Mission (30 May, 2008). Republic of Armenia 
Presidential Elections 19 February, 2008. Warsaw. Retrieved 23 September, 2008, 
from http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2008/05/31397_en.pdf. 
15 CRRC  2007 
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“Both pro-government and pro-opposition media is 
biased.” (Female, 18-40, Armenia) 
 
In comparison, Georgia has the highest level of trust in media among the 
three countries: 50 percent of respondents in Georgia somewhat or fully 
trust the media vs. 9 percent of those who fully or somewhat distrust (see 
Chart 3).16  
 
Chart 3 
Respondent's trust towards media -- CRRC Data Initiative 2007
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Focus group participants confirmed the results of the Data Initiative survey 
regarding the general distrust towards national media, and especially the 
broadcast media.17  
 
“I don’t trust TV because it doesn’t correspond to the reality at all. There are 
cases when you witness something and they report something totally different.” 
(Female, 18-40, Armenia)   
 
Moreover, the participants were more skeptical towards political rather 
than social or cultural news which supports the hypothesis that political 
engagement creates lower levels of trust in the media in Armenia as 
compared to Azerbaijan.  
 
“I don’t trust TV concerning politics, but when it comes to other issues, I think 
there is something objective.”  (Female, 18-40, Armenia) 
 
“I don’t watch TV for news, just for cultural events.” (Female, 18-40, Armenia) 
  
                                             
16 This situation may have significantly changed in Georgia since the Data 
Initiative 2007 was carried out.  
17 This issue was brought up by the organizers of the focus groups: during 
recruitment, people refused to participate in the discussion as they didn’t trust the 
media and didn’t want to discuss the subject.  
 15 
As research and studies also suggest, trust in the media declines when the 
issue is considered as more controversial or simply as bad news. With less 
involving topics, more messages fall into the categories of acceptance and 
non-commitment, and are considered without extra judgment.18 
 
The sense that bias is particularly salient in the coverage of politics and 
current affairs raises questions about the reason for bias in particular types 
of news coverage. Bias can come from a large variety of sources, 
including journalists themselves, media management, and the 
government. Focus group participants focused on control of the media by 
the State as the predominant reason for bias. 
 
“The major problem now is the control of authorities.”  
(Male, 18-40, Armenia) 
 
“The reason is that very often I see that our national mass 
media doesn’t have its own policy, especially the TV 
stations. Several TV stations are simply under pressure.”  
(Male, 18-40, Armenia)  
 
State-owned Public TV (H1) was considered to be the most biased 
because of its obvious alignment with the government. While Armenia has 
no specific laws or regulations that specifically favor government-financed 
media over private, H1 is afforded preferential treatment by the authorities. 
Firstly, it requires no license and secondly, it is exempt from regulations 
which limit advertising on private television to 10 minutes per hour.19 
Moreover, all five members of its Board are appointed by the president20 
and some studies suggest that it is this political dependence which is one 
of the main reasons for the lack of objectivity and diversity in its news 
coverage.21  Focus group respondents concur with this position: 
 
“The fact that H1 is pro-government is without question. 
People learn about the president’s visits and other 
important state news from H1.”  (Male, 40+, Armenia) 
 
“H1 is the channel of authorities. They show whatever is 
dictated.” (Male, 40+, Armenia) 
 
H1 has more access to information not simply because it is sometimes the 
only channel permitted to cover official events, but also because it has the 
most substantial budget of any media outlet in Armenia.22 H1’s allocations 
from the state budget have in recent years grown exponentially, rising from 
                                             
18Gunther, A. C. (Summer, 1992). “Biased Press or Biased Public? Attitudes Toward 
Media Coverage of Social Groups”. The Public Opinion Quarterly. Vol. 56, No 2. 
19 IREX (2008). Media Sustainability Index (MSI) - Europe and Eurasia 2008. 
Retrieved 23 September, 2008 from 
http://www.irex.org/programs/MSI_EUR/2008/armenia.asp 
20 OSCE (2006). The State of Media Freedom in Armenia: Observations and 
Recommendations. Retrieved 23 September, 2008 from 
http://www.osce.org/documents/oy/2007/05/24699_en.pdf 
21 Ibid. 
22 A comparison with other large broadcasters such as Shant and Armenia would 
be a key point, but according to representative of both Shat and Armenia their 
budgets are “a commercial secret”  
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a reported $5 million in 2006 to $16 million in 2007.23 Moreover, at least 
one report suggests that the government has applied pressure on large 
Armenian enterprises to advertise exclusively on H1 – further expanding 
the channel’s financial resources.24  
 
Having secured access to information, H1 strictly tows the government 
line in its coverage and does not broadcast a variety of opinions or 
interview those with opposing views. According to focus group 
participants: 
 
“It’s a shame, when they present such a show on Public 
TV and something which couldn’t have happened in 
reality.” (Female, 18-40, Armenia)  
 
“No, no, no, don’t even speak about H1. It provides low-
quality, false news…” (Female, 40+, Armenia) 
 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that Public TV has the widest coverage in 
Armenia and remains the main if not only source of information in most 
rural areas.25 
 
Among the channels mentioned by focus group participants as being more 
reliable – Shant, Kentron, and Yerkir Media – only the first has nation-wide 
coverage while the others are broadcast mainly in Yerevan. The 
participants also acknowledged that H1 is the most watched channel 
outside the capital. 
 
“It depends on how widespread the media is. For example 
in villages, marzes – they watch only Public TV.” (Female, 
18-40, Armenia) 
 
“I think people mostly watch H1 in the villages.” (Female, 
18-40, Armenia)  
 
“The first channel [H1] is the channel of authorities. They 
show whatever is dictated whereas Shant provides a little 
truth.” (Male, 40+, Armenia) 
 
“I trust Shant, Kentron, and Yerkir-Media.” (Female, 40+, 
Armenia) 
  
State pressure on the media does not restrict itself to H1, however. A 
report by Freedom House indicates that while the government does not 
apply direct control or censorship over the media, it maintains a strong 
hold particularly on the broadcast media through informal pressure on its 
owners26. Again, statements from focus group respondents converge with 
such reports. 
                                             
23 IREX (2008). Media Sustainability Index (MSI) - Europe and Eurasia 2008. 
Retrieved 23 September, 2008 from 
http://www.irex.org/programs/MSI_EUR/2008/armenia.asp 
24 Ibid. 
25 OSCE (2006). The State of Media Freedom in Armenia: Observations and 
Recommendations. Retrieved 23 September, 2008, from 
http://www.osce.org/documents/oy/2007/05/24699_en.pdf 
26 Freedom House (2007). Map of Press Freedom 2007. Retrieved 23 September, 
2008, from 
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“All kinds of media is being controlled, be it state-owned or 
private.” (Male, 40+, Armenia) 
 
While participants’ eschewed control by the State when discussing the 
media, their stance on the issue of control and regulation was more 
nuanced when confronted with the issue directly. Though opinions 
regarding regulation and control of media differed across the focus groups, 
there was general agreement that while information should be accurate, 
the State should control its flow for the sake of national security. 
 
“Of course, they should control as there are state secrets 
and country’s interests that the media should not present 
to people.”  (Female, 40+, Armenia) 
 
“The mass media follows certain principles and they know 
very well what information is needed to be objective, 
subjective, or half-objective so that it doesn’t have side 
effects. Information in its entirety shouldn’t be presented 
openly and freely. That wouldn’t be correct.”   (Female, 18-
40, Armenia) 
 
The Male 40+ group generally thought that media should be regulated by 
the State through legislation and that control is acceptable if it is carried 
out by the government. The Male 18-40 group mostly thought that control 
of the media by the government is not only acceptable, but some even 
said it is necessary.  
 
“The State should have control. It may give the right to the 
media to orientate, within legal norms, but control should 
be carried by a body, a structure which is unbiased and 
fair in its decisions.” (Male, 40+, Armenia) 
 
“The State should pay attention so that there is no leak of 
information in terms of international relationships which 
would be unfavorable for the State. The information 
should be accurate, but not unfavorable for the State.” 
(Male, 18-40, Armenia) 
 
However, there could be some misunderstanding of the meaning of the 
words control and regulation, with some focus group participants taking the 
former to mean the latter.27 Regardless, they believed that there are limits 
to how much information should be provided to the population and that 
total freedom of the media could cause chaos. While some studies 
suggest that freedom of the press, unlike freedom of speech, should be 
conditional on the degree to which it promotes certain values at the core of 
freedom of expression,28 the concept of regulation is vague and 
participants showed little understanding of how the media could be 
regulated without violating the basic tenets of a representative democracy. 
                                                                                                                          
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&country=7129&year=20
07 
27 In any follow up work it is recommended that concrete examples of the two 
concepts are provided and probing more thoroughly each idea individually (see 
Appendix 3 for the guide itself) 
28 Lichtenberg, J. Ed. (1990). Democracy and the Mass Media. New York: 
Cambridge. University Press. 
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The participants also emphasized that information which might result in a 
negative reaction should not be presented to the public, but this was also 
considered in a vague way. 
 
Despite the lack of trust in the media, broadcast media remains the main 
source of political news for 67 percent percent of Armenians.29 In contrast, 
radio is the first main source of information for one percent ,and 
newspapers for two percent of respondents in Armenia. Interestingly, 22 
percent of respondents receive information about national politics from 
family members, neighbors and friends. This makes social and family 
networks the second most popular source of information on national 
politics after TV. 
 
For the informed denizens of Yerevan who participated in the focus group, 
the Internet served as a vital and trusted source of information30:  
 
“I trust newspapers and the Internet more because they 
express different opinions. You can read and analyze for 
yourself.” (Male, 18-40, Armenia) 
 
“I’d like to say that we use the Internet more because 
there are several sites where you can get objective 
information about Armenia.”  (Male, 18-40) 
 
Indeed, participants preferred the Internet over the broadcast or print 
media because of the variety of opinions and lack of censorship.31  
 
Again it is worth reiterating that focus groups were conducted only in the 
capital where people have more access to the Internet. CRRC data shows 
only 1 percent of respondents in Armenia use the Internet for receiving 
information about national politics.32  Only 4 percent of respondents have 
dial-up and 1 percent DSL or wireless Internet connections at home. 
Indeed, 86 percent of respondents in Armenia had no basic knowledge of 
Internet or E-mail. 
 
While the Internet and print media might still have earned some trust in 
Armenia, the results of the focus groups show that trust in the media has 
significantly declined in the last decade.  
 
The rejection of an application by the A1 + TV station to renew its 
broadcasting license by the National Commission for TV and Radio33 
(NCTR) in 2002 delivered the first major setback for freedom of media in 
Armenia. Until then, A1+ was considered the main media outlet that 
                                             
29 Ibid. 
30 Given the limited scope of this project, which Internet sites focus group 
participants used could not be addressed. It is recommended that follow up 
focus groups particularly concentrate on this issue.  
31 Interestingly, no one mentioned the commonplace refrain from Western 
countries that there is a lack of accountability and review process for material 
published on the Internet. (see for example Vedder A. and Wachbroit A. (October 
28, 2004). “Reliability of information on the Internet: Some distinctions”. Ethics and 
Information Technology. Volume 5, No 4. pg 211-215.)  
32 CRRC , 2007 
33 The members of the NCTR Board are appointed by the president. 
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presented alternative political views which differed from the government. 
According to a 2007 report by Freedom House, most television stations 
have grown more politically aligned with the government since A1+ was 
taken off the air and remain selective in their reporting, routinely ignore 
opposition viewpoints in order to avoid the same fate.34  
 
The presidential election of February 2008 and its immediate aftermath 
delivered yet another blow to the media. The favorable coverage of then 
Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan, when compared to the completely 
negative coverage of other candidates, played a significant role in 
increasing the level of tensions surrounding the elections. According to the 
OSCE/ODHIR Election Observation Mission report on the presidential 
election, the state-owned H1 did not treat the candidates equally despite 
allocating comparable airtime to their campaigns in its news coverage. 
Moreover, although the main opposition candidate, former President Levon 
Ter-Petrossian, was the most covered in terms of total airtime alloted, the 
majority of coverage was negative. Public radio adopted a similar 
approach while the state-owned Hayastani Hanrapetutyun newspaper 
gave clear preferential and generally positive coverage to Sargsyan in 
some 45 percent of its print space devoted to the elections.35 
 
Participants agreed that there was more trust in media in the years directly 
following Armenian independence, and that this had drastically reduced 
since 1998, and especially after the 2008 presidential election.  
 
“Maybe before 1999 it was better. The whole family used 
to watch and we used to believe. Now we watch and we 
don’t believe.” (Male, 18-40, Armenia) 
 
“I think in 1998 it used to be better than now. It’s changing 
for the worse.” (Male, 18-40, Armenia) 
 
“My trust was greater before the last elections. Now I think 
there is more pressure from above.” (Female, 40+, 
Armenia) 
 
In addition to believing that press freedom had declined in Armenia, the 
majority of respondents believed that the media in Georgia, albeit with 
some shortcomings, is currently freer than that in either Armenia or 
Azerbaijan.  
 
“In Georgia […] they are more ahead. There is not only 
freedom of speech, but there are also no violations or 
bribes. People know that if they break a law they will be 
punished. It’s more like it is in Europe.” (Male, 18-40, 
Armenia) 
  
                                             
34 Freedom House (2007). Map of Press Freedom 2007 -Armenia. Retrieved 23 
September, 2008, from 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&country=7129&year=2007 
 
35 OSCE/ODHIR Election Observation Mission (30 May, 2008). Republic of Armenia 
Presidential Elections 19 February, 2008. Warsaw. Retrieved 23 September, 2008, 
from http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2008/05/31397_en.pdf   
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Some, however, argued that Georgia and Armenia were equally free and it 
was Azerbaijan that is lagging behind.  
 
“I think Armenia and Georgia are the same, but that 
Azerbaijan is behind. The protests during the last 
presidential election in Georgia indicate the level of 
freedom of speech there, or at least the struggle for 
freedom of speech. It was obvious on TV.” (Male, 40+, 
Armenia)  
 
An exceptional few argued that the media is freer in Armenia. 
 
 “I think that there is more freedom of speech in Armenia 
and that it is less controlled and regulated by the State 
than in Azerbaijan and Georgia.”  (Male, 40+, Armenia)  
 
Probably demonstrating a high level of cynicism, some participants 
believed that there is no freedom of the press in any of the three countries.  
 
“There is no freedom of speech – neither in Armenia, 
Georgia or Azerbaijan.”  (Male, 40+, Armenia) 
 
Certainly, Azerbaijan was considered to be the least free in the opinion of 
Armenian focus group participants.  
 
“They [Azerbaijan] are talking more about their president 
on TV. It is being regulated by the government. They 
show good news but it doesn’t mean there is freedom of 
speech.” (Female, 18-40, Armenia) 
 
Available studies also suggest that the media in all three countries does 
not adequately report events happening in neighboring countries. While 
the Georgian and Armenian media generally refrains from publishing 
inflammatory articles about the other, a study of the Armenian and 
Azerbaijani print media revealed that the majority of reports were mutually 
intolerant and unfavorable.36 The generally negative coverage of 
Azerbaijan in the national media could also have influenced Armenian 
participants into believing that there is no freedom of the press there since 
it is unlikely that they have watched Azerbaijani television. The Country 
Coordinator of the Media Diversity Institute Artur Papyan also confirmed 
that “Azerbaijani media outlets have no influence whatsoever on the 
Armenian media landscape.”37  
                                             
36 Yerevan Press Club, Yeni Nesil Journalists Union of Azerbaijan & Black Sea Press 
Association (2005). What Can a Word Do? Materials of Armenian, Azerbaijani and 
Georgian Press Analysis. Retrieved September 20, 2008, from  
http://www.ypc.am/eng/?go=act/studies  
37 E-mail correspondence with Artur Papyan, Country Coordinator, Media Diversity 
Institute, Armenia, October 17, 2008.  
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Section 2 Reporting 
The dissatisfaction of focus groups participants with the control of media 
and bias in reporting concerned not only the local news, but also the 
media’s international coverage.  
 
“…Armenian mass media takes information from other 
channels. Often we can see the logo of other channels 
such as ORT [on reports]. It means they just take already 
existing material, and if there already exists a lack of 
information or if something goes wrong we get totally 
misinformed.” (Male, 18-40, Armenia)   
 
“…our reporters themselves receive little information 
about international events because of the lack of 
resources […] or because they don’t have specialists 
working in every country. And most information they do 
have is from other international channels.” (Male, 40+, 
Armenia) 
 
“I don’t mean that they are doing it on purpose. Simply 
their professional level is very low.” (Male, 18-40, 
Armenia)  
 
Such quotes highlight several reasons for disappointment with 
international new coverage, and in particular: 
1. the low professional level of journalists; 
2. news being taken from foreign channels with inadequate or 
no commentary at all; 
3. media outlets lacking the necessary resources to cover 
international stories; 
4. media outlets enforcing self censorship with regards to the 
type of stories they cover.  
 
According to a study of the media in Armenia conducted by IREX, news 
outlets sometimes have to sacrifice ethical reporting because they lack 
adequate financial resources to allow journalists to check information from 
several sources and verify or check facts..38 However, such practices are 
relatively inexpensive and the question remains how to promote this type 
of behavior. As argued in the recommendations section of this report, a 
voluntary code of ethics and a community of practice is more important 
than simply money in order to remedy the situation. 
 
Beyond the quality of reporting, participants were also generally unhappy 
not only with the quality of reporting, but also the focus of international 
news stories. For example, they thought that countries with large ethnic 
Armenian communities should feature more extensively in the international 
news.  
 
“In countries where there is a large Armenian Diaspora. 
Any Armenian, irrespective of which country they are in, 
                                             
38 IREX (2008). Media Sustainability Index (MSI) - Europe and Eurasia 2008. 
Retrieved 23 September, 2008, from 
http://www.irex.org/programs/MSI_EUR/2008/armenia.asp  
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should feel themselves part of their homeland.” (Woman 
40+, Armenia) 
Interestingly, male participants noted that the focus of international news 
should be more on Turkey and Azerbaijan, considering that the public 
should be informed about those countries Armenia is in conflict with. 
 
“I would like the mass media to concentrate on Turkey 
and Azerbaijan – two hostile countries. We can expect 
any hostility from them. They are accumulating arsenals 
and doubling their budget, and besides, the better you 
know your enemy, the easier it is to beat them.” (Male, 18-
40, Armenia) 
 
In comparison, to the male participants, some female participants 
generally agreed that Azerbaijan is presented badly in the media, 
explaining this as the result of existing bias and self-censorship in the 
media. They also believed that negative coverage fuels hatred between 
the two countries.   
 
“I can say that Azerbaijan is presented badly in the media 
and that they [media] are trying to arouse a kind of 
hatred… I don’t understand.”   (Male, 40+, Armenia) 
 
“Our news agencies give information that doesn’t 
correspond to reality. They may speak about Azerbaijanis,  
butit may not correspond to reality…” (Female, 18-40) 
 
“They may want to present the truth, but they may not be 
allowed.” (Male, 40+, Armenia) 
 
However, with the exception of the Male 18-40 group that considered 
individual Azerbaijanis to be enemies and represented in the media 
accordingly, participants generally displayed a tolerant attitude.  They 
blamed the conflict on politics and explained that the average citizen does 
not want war.  
 
“Ordinary people – Armenian, Georgian or Azerbaijani –
have never had enmity towards each other and will never 
have. It is done artificially, for political reasons…” 
(Female, 40+, Armenia) 
 
“The Azerbaijanis are ordinary people like us.” (Male, 40+, 
Armenia) 
 
“Peoples aren’t enemies. They are made into enemies. 
This is policy. If states want to solve the problem of 
friendship they can do so in a few months.” (Male, 40+, 
Armenia)  
 
Generally, all participants, including males, recognized the need for more 
information about Azerbaijan, but the importance of receiving news from 
there was only mentioned by some of the groups. Moreover, such 
responses only came after probing questions from the moderator.   
 
“We can stay as enemies, but we should know about 
them. It’s important.” (Female, 18-40, Armenia)    
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 “If it is very important for Azerbaijan to be covered so that 
we are aware of our neighbor which is a hostile country.” 
(Male, 18-40, Armenia) 
 
The need for more accurate information to be conveyed to the general 
public in order to provide a more secure environment is at odds with the 
idea that the State should regulate such kinds of information. Such 
differing positions demonstrate the lack of set public opinions on some 
issues as well as the ability to shape attitudes towards media coverage – a 
topic which will be returned to in the recommendations section of this 
report.  
 
Focus group participants were also concerned that people in Armenia 
were not aware about the situation in Nagorno Karabakh and were 
concerned with a growing gap between both.39  
 
“I am sure they know the situation in Karabakh and 
Armenia very well in Azerbaijan. We can conclude that 
information remains secret only for our people. If 
Azerbaijan needs it, they know the information very well.”  
(Female, 18-40, Armenia) 
 
“…We are unaware about what happens in Karabakh. 
There is some hostility between people from Karabakh 
and Armenia, especially between the younger 
generations. This happens because the mass media 
doesn’t tell us what happens in Karabakh, what they think, 
and how they consider us. The same is true in Karabakh 
regarding Armenia.” (Male, 18-40, Armenia) 
 
Again, such views demonstrate the conflicting opinions Armenians have 
towards the dissemination of news and information about Nagorno 
Karabakh. On the one hand, they are wary that too much information  
could potentially be used against them, but on the other, there is the view 
that Azerbaijanis already have enough information and that it is the 
population of Armenia that is left in the dark about what is occurring in 
Nagorno Karabakh.  
 
More information about how Armenians perceive Nagorno Karabakh is 
scant. According to one study conducted by the Armenian Center for 
National and International Studies, 29.6 percent are not satisfied with the 
information they receive and attempt to find more from other sources. 
Another 35 percent of Armenians are not satisfied with the official 
information about the Nagorno Karabakh peace process, but have no 
access to other relevant sources of information.40  
 
However, more depth is needed to make better sense of this information 
and whether it contradicts or refutes the qualitative data collected by the 
focus groups. While many participants opined that they did not know what 
                                             
39 The attitude of the population towards Karabakh and Karabakhis who are 
involved in Armenian politics is worth further exploration, but not the topic of this 
report.  
40 Armenian Center for National and International Studies (2005). The Karabakh 
story: 17 years in progress. Retrieved October 6, 2008, from  
http://www.acnis.am/pr/karabakh_story/Socio12eng.pdf  
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was occurring in Nagorno Karabakh, they tended to trust official news 
sources on this subject.  
 
“I accept the way the State thinks." (Male, 18-40, 
Armenia) 
 “I may trust independent sources, but when we receive 
official information we have to trus itt. As a resident of this 
state I should trust official information.”  (Male, 18-40, 
Armenia) 
 
“Of course, and it would be wrong to turn an official 
information into a lie. I don’t think TV is such a body that 
every lie can go into it.”   (Male, 18-40, Armenia) 
 
Some of these apparently contradictory set of opinions from Armenian 
respondents can be explained by the fact that there is still not much 
debate about the question of Nagorno Karabakh’s status. The population 
generally agrees with the State’s position and is therefore more likely to 
accept information about Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan without 
predisposed judgment. However, they would like to receive more 
information regardless of whether it is controlled by the government or not. 
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AZERBAIJAN 
Section 1 Media Outlets 
Since Azerbaijan gained independence from the former Soviet Union, its 
media has been transformed from a state-run system into a variety of new 
media outlets. There is one state, one public and four private TV and radio 
companies that cover the entire country. In addition, 6 regional TV and 
radio companies operate within the country41 and there are over 2,000 
registered newspapers although only 180-200 function in reality.42 
However, despite the large number of media outlets, there is a lack of 
pluralism in the political views expressed and the independence of the 
media is declining.  
 
Most media in Azerbaijan is aligned with the government and the few 
independent media outlets which do exist are continuously subjected to 
government pressure.43 As Shahin Abbasov, Deputy Chief of Party at the 
IREX/USAID Media Advancement Project in Azerbaijan, commented: “the 
media in Azerbaijan is predominantly controlled by the government. All 
television channels are totally controlled by the authorities. The same 
applies to local radio stations.”44 
 
While the participants of focus groups confirmed that the media is biased 
in Azerbaijan, they explained this in terms of the polarization of the media 
between the government and opposition. These views could be based on 
stereotypes or outdated beliefs, as the opposition media used to play a 
stronger role in the country. 
 
“In our case, except for some, most of the media is not 
independent. There is opposition and power media. 
Power media makes a lot of exaggerations in the news 
while the opposition media writes lies and insults.” (Male, 
18-40, Azerbaijan) 
 
“The media represents the interests of certain groups, but 
not national values.” (Male, 40+, Azerbaijan) 
 
“Today’s media in Azerbaijan is divided into two parts:  
pro-government and pro-opposition.” (Female, 40+, 
Azerbaijan) 
 
“They are divided into two in Azerbaijan, and whether they 
are government or opposition oriented, there are nearly 
no objective ones. They struggle in two fronts and earn 
money from publishing newspapers.”  (Male, 18-40) 
 
                                             
41 Yunusova, L. Freedom of Word and Mass Media in Azerbaijan (2007). Retrieved 
20 October, 2008 from 
http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2007/10/27014_en.pdf 
42 Ibid. 
43 Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper (2004). Media, the Presidential Elections and 
the Aftermath. Retrieved 3 October, 2008, from 
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/azerbaijan/2004/1.htm#_Toc79222789 
44 E-mail correspondence with Shahin Abbasov, the Deputy Chief of Party at 
IREX/USAID Media Advancement Project in Azerbaijan, October 21, 2008. 
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Interestingly, the diversity of viewpoints expressed in the media was 
treated with mistrust and cynicism by most of the participants, identifying a 
conflation of different views on various issues and false or misleading 
information. 
 
“You cannot rely on any of them [mass media]. Some of 
them report in one way, some in another.” (Female, 18-
40, Azerbaijan) 
 
“It is a problem. They all report in different ways and you 
can get confused.” (Female, 18-40, Azerbaijan) 
 
This distrust of the national mass media has led many of the focus group 
participants to rely on Turkish channels and international news networks 
for news coverage instead. Representing a consensus of opinion across 
the focus groups, as one participant stated:  
 
“Turkish media covers the news and provides better 
analyzed news to people, particularly in newspapers and 
TV.” (Male, 18-40, Azerbaijan)  
 
The popularity of the Turkish media in Azerbaijan can be explained by the 
mutual comprehensibility of the two languages and strong cultural and 
ethnic ties between the two countries. However, the role of Turkish 
channels is limited because they are only available in Azerbaijan via cable 
and satellite.45 According to the CRRC Data Initiative, only 22 percent of 
Azerbaijanis have satellite dishes and 14 percent cable TV.46 Moreover, it 
is important to take into consideration the fact that while Turkish media can 
be a reliable source for international news coverage, it provides minimal 
coverage of news about Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh.47  
 
Besides the Turkish media, however, an alternative source of information 
for Azerbaijanis, especially for those living in Baku, is the Internet. Indeed, 
it was this medium that was seen as a reliable source by the majority of 
focus group participants.   
 
“The government cannot interfere with the Internet.” (18-
40, Azerbaijan)  
 
“I basically use the Internet because in Azerbaijan under 
the conditions of monopoly it is just a waste of time. I try 
to learn from the Internet and foreign websites, be it in 
Azerbaijani, Russian, or English.” (Male, 18-40, 
Azerbaijan)  
 
However, the Internet generally continues to remain the privilege of those 
residing in the cities and even then, only for a minority. According to 
CRRC’s Data Initiative only one percent of respondents in Azerbaijan use 
the Internet as their first main source of information for national politics.48 
                                             
45 E-mail correspondence with Shahin Abbasov, the Deputy Chief of Party at 
IREX/USAID Media Advancement Project in Azerbaijan, October 21, 2008. 
46 CRRC Data Initiative 2007 
47 E-mail correspondence with Shahin Abbasov, the Deputy Chief of Party at 
IREX/USAID Media Advancement Project in Azerbaijan, October 21, 2008. 
48 CRRC Data Initiative 2007 
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Even so, according to another study, Internet access is generally 
unrestricted in Azerbaijan albeit limited to less than 10 percent of the 
population residing in larger cities.49 
 
Therefore, despite government control and public distrust of the media, 
broadcast media remains the main source of information for national 
politics for 79 percent of the population in Azerbaijan.50 This perhaps 
indicates the distinct lack of citizen engagement with the Azerbaijani print 
media. Among focus group participants, for example, only a few relied on 
newspapers for news. 
 
“I think the newspapers are preferred when compared to 
other mass media. They may be delivered late or may 
contain old information, but anyway, people read them.” 
(Female, 18-40, Azerbaijan)  
 
Some studies also confirm the fact that newspapers are often distributed 
later and that news is first available on Baku-based television stations.51 
This situation is especially true in the regions of the country. CRRC’s Data 
Initiative data also shows that newspapers are not a popular means of 
information in Azerbaijan, with only two percent of respondents relying on 
the print media for news about national politics.52  
 
“I think facts are more accurate on TV. That’s why TV 
dominates. TV provides more information than the 
newspapers.” (Female, 40+, Azerbaijan)  
 
Among the main reasons for this situation is that newspapers have a 
limited circulation. As one media observer stated, “there are some 
opposition newspapers in the country, but the print media industry is 
suffering a serious decline in Azerbaijan - newspaper circulation is very 
low and so the print media does not play significant role in shaping public 
opinion.”53  
 
Moreover, in addition to its limited circulation, some studies suggest that 
the print media’s lack of popularity results from existing biases and control 
by the State.54 The government also controls the main printing houses and 
at times applies pressure on smaller independent presses not to publish 
independent newspapers and magazines. Furthermore, public officials 
often block access to information for journalists working for the 
                                             
49 Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper (2004). Media, the Presidential Elections 
and the Aftermath. Retrieved 3 October, 2008, from 
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/azerbaijan/2004/1.htm#_Toc79222789 
50 CRRC Data Initiative 2007 
51 IREX (2008). Media Sustainability Index (MSI) - Europe and Eurasia 2008. 
Retrieved 23 September, 2008, from 
http://www.irex.org/programs/msi_eur/2008/azerbaijan.asp 
52 CRRC Data Initiative 2007  
53 E-mail correspondence with Shahin Abbasov, the Deputy Chief of Party at 
IREX/USAID Media Advancement Project in Azerbaijan, October 21, 2008. 
54 Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper (2004). Media, the Presidential Elections and 
the Aftermath. Retrieved 3 October, 2008, from 
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/azerbaijan/2004/1.htm#_Toc79222789 
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independent media. Police also harass and beat journalists covering 
opposition party events or protests. 55  
 
Focus group participants seemed to agree that the media was freer 
immediately after independence, but believe that it gradually became more 
biased and controlled by the State over time.   
 
“I used to believe from 1989 to 2005. Then control was 
strengthened.” (Female, 40+, Azerbaijan)  
 
“In the last 2-3 years there is an information monopoly; 
the media is too weak.” (Male, 18-40, Azerbaijan) 
 
“I think there are serious changes - in a negative 
direction.” (Male, 18-40, Azerbaijan) 
 
Studies confirm the findings of the focus groups that there is a general 
decrease in the freedom of media in Azerbaijan, especially after the 2003 
presidential election. Such signs were noticeable in the pre-election period 
and were marked by an increase in the intimidation and harassment of 
journalists reporting on the opposition campaign. 56 
 
Focus group participants did not believe, however, that the problems of 
media bias and control by the State were only present in Azerbaijan. 
 
“In all three countries, there is a problem with freedom of 
speech. That is why European countries take these three 
countries as a whole. Democracy progresses with the 
same speed in all three countries.” (Male, 18-40, 
Azerbaijan)  
 
Nevertheless, most believed that the Georgian media is comparatively 
freer among the countries of the South Caucasus although opinions varied 
regarding Armenia. Some participants thought that the media was freer 
there than in Azerbaijan, for example, while others claimed the opposite.  
 
“I think freedom of speech is relatively high in Georgia. 
However the situation is worse in Armenia when 
compared to Azerbaijan.” (Female, 18-40, Azerbaijan) 
 
“In my opinion, the situation is the same in Georgia and 
Azerbaijan. Georgia may be ahead of Azerbaijan in some 
respects, but the conditions are poorer in Armenia. The 
presidential elections in Armenia proved that there is no 
freedom of speech.” (Female, 18-40) 
 
“According to international reports, the situation is better 
in Georgia, but Armenia and Georgia may replace each 
other at some point.”  (Female, 18-40, Azerbaijan) 
 
Only a few thought that Azerbaijan was ahead of Armenia and Georgia.  
                                             
55 Ibid. 
56 Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper (2004). Media, the Presidential Elections 
and the Aftermath. Retrieved 3 October, 2008, from 
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/azerbaijan/2004/1.htm#_Toc79222789 
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“As a journalist I would like to say that I know more or less 
about their media. Let’s confess that the situation is better 
in our country. There is despotism in Georgia now and the 
media was forbidden in Armenia with Internet access 
banned. The media in Azerbaijan is more independent 
compared to that of other countries in the Caucasus.” 
(Male, 40, Azerbaijan) 
 
Section 2 Reporting 
The focus groups also revealed a general concern not only with regards to 
bias in the national news, but also in terms of the quality of international 
news coverage. In particular, focus group participants complained that 
international news stories are taken in their entirety from foreign channels.  
 
“As for the international news, it is copied from other 
channels and sources, such as Russian or Turkish.” (Male, 
18-40, Azerbaijan)  
 
Therefore, participants preferred external sources for international news in 
the form of Turkish channels or international news networks such as CNN 
and the BBC.  
 
“While international channels cover the events in detail 
and on time, our channels do not present enough 
information and are late.” (Female, 40+, Azerbaijan) 
 
“I think they do not cover international news sufficiently. I 
watch news on Turkish channels. They provide more 
analyzed, detailed and fresh news, whereas in our case, 
they show archive pictures accompanied with empty 
words.” (Male, 18-40, Azerbaijan)  
 
As discussed earlier in this report, while Turkish channels might provide 
more timely and accurate international news coverage, they are still 
targeted towards a Turkish audience. Issues that concern Azerbaijan, and 
are of importance to its foreign policy such as coverage of Armenia and 
Nagorno Karabakh, might therefore not necessarily be represented.  
 
The quality of the international news coverage was also not the only 
concern. Participants also complained that international coverage is often 
made up of irrelevant stories or news on show business.  
 
“Unfortunately, the TV channels have been airing too 
many show business programs recently. Each program 
has its daily airtime. People are tired of show business 
news. 10 percent of people watch these programs, 
whereas the remaining 90 percent do not watch them.”  
(Male, 40+, Azerbaijan) 
 
Studies of the situation with the media in Azerbaijan also indicate that 
aside from occasional programs about the problems faced by internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) from the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, complete 
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with political overtones, there is little that otherwise reflects social 
conditions in the country.57   
 
And while both the Turkish broadcast and print media is one of the 
preferred sources of information for many participants, they still expressed 
a willingness to receive even more news about Turkey.  
 
“More attention is paid to our neighboring countries: 
Turkey, the processes going on there, its economic 
development and any news about it.” (Male, 40+, 
Azerbaijan)  
 
The participants also believed that there should be more coverage of other 
neighboring countries in international news..  
 
“There are countries that are close to Azerbaijan, such as 
Russia, Iran, Armenia, and Turkey. Their news should be 
more reported by the media. We do not need European 
news. I think more focus should be on neighboring 
countries.” (Male, 18-40, Azerbaijan) 
 
Interestingly, Armenia was mentioned by a few participants alongside 
other bordering countries, but without any specific emphasis. The 
importance of presenting news about the other side in the Nagorno 
Karabakh conflict was recognized by the participants only after the 
moderator probed deeper. Participants then complained that the media 
does not provide enough information about Armenia and Nagorno 
Karabakh with some emphasizing that it is better to know your enemy.  
 
“They are our enemies and we must be aware of the 
processes going on there.”  (Female, 18-40, Azerbaijan) 
 
The general concern, however, was not so much the lack of knowledge 
about Armenia, but rather the lack of anti-Armenian propaganda in the 
media. The general concern of focus group participants was that the 
younger generation is not informed enough about the war.  
 
“I think they should be portrayed as our enemy so that the 
younger generation and children understand that our 
territories have been under Armenian occupation for 
several years and about how they maltreated our nation.” 
(Female, 18-40, Azerbaijan) 
 
According to the focus group participants, the role of the media should be 
to fuel animosity against Armenia and stress the need for revenge against 
Armenians.  
 
“The responsibility or role of the national media is to 
report such news so that young people become even 
more patriotic when reading them, and have a sense of 
vengeance and bellicosity.” (Male, 18-40, Azerbaijan)  
 
                                             
57IREX (2008). Media Sustainability Index (MSI) - Europe and Eurasia 2008. Retrieved 
23 September, 2008, from 
http://www.irex.org/programs/msi_eur/2008/azerbaijan.asp 
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Such a perspective seemingly lies in direct contradiction to the earlier 
stated desire to prevent the media from serving as a propaganda machine 
and for it to become a source of unbiased and professionally produced 
news. Instead, with a collective trauma playing a central role in post-
independence Azerbaijan, citizens say they want propaganda although this 
does not rule out unbiased news on the Nagorno Karabakh conflict in 
addition to other programming, particularly of a historical nature, that could 
serve as propaganda. 
 
However, a more serious barrier to an unbiased media that focus groups 
participants specifically identified was that it is not fulfilling its perceived 
role in portraying Armenia as the enemy. 
 
“Internally, we should raise our youth with the psychology 
that any piece of our Karabakh territory cannot be given to 
our enemies. It should be an issue to be promoted 
internally. I believe it will finally be effective.” (Male, 18-40, 
Azerbaijan) 
 
Indeed, the need for journalists to fulfill this role was seen as particularly 
urgent by older participants in the focus groups. Arguing that the issue of 
Nagorno Karabakh is losing its urgency among younger Azerbaijanis, 
concern was expressed that later generations might not be as passionate 
about fighting again if such a need arouse.  
 
“Generally, the aggressiveness of the early 90s is abating. 
Both we and they are getting indifferent. They have their 
own social and economic problems and we have our own 
social problems already brought to the focus in media. But 
this problem still remains unsolved.” (Male, 40+, 
Azerbaijan) 
 
Therefore, by constantly reporting on Nagorno Karabakh, it was 
considered that the media should keep the image of war alive and 
encourage animosity towards Armenia. Regardless, while participants did 
not trust official sources for local or international news, they did rely on 
them for news and information about Nagorno Karabakh.  
 
“Of course, state TV reports true news. It is possible that 
they will hide some of the news, but not all of it.” (Male, 
40+, Azerbaijan)  
 
“In general, most TV media does report objectively on 
Nagorno Karabakh. ANS is different in a sense that it 
keeps reminding us of the topic. When you switch to this 
channel, you can see it there.” (Male, 40+, Azerbaijan) 
 
Again, this could probably be explained by the mutual consensus of 
opinion in society on Nagorno Karabakh and the general acceptance by 
the public of the official stance towards the conflict. As a result, the 
population is more likely to accept information they receive on this topic 
from the government.  
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
Taking into consideration the problems brought up by focus group 
participants and revealed by other studies, this report sets forth the 
following recommendations:  
 
To the Government of Armenia and Azerbaijan 
 
Accurate reporting can be in the national interest 
Traditionally, international watchdog groups have argued that media 
freedom is in itself a necessary component of democratic development. 
While undoubtedly a key element of democracy, this strategy has not 
proven fruitful in promoting media freedom to date in either Armenia or 
Azerbaijan. 
 
Instead, the focus groups identify the need for a different strategy which 
promotes the idea that accurate and unbiased reporting is in the national 
interest. In both Armenia and Azerbaijan, for example, focus group 
participants expressed the desire for more accurate information about the 
other in order to defend their national interests.  In the eyes of these 
citizens it is clear that self-delusion on the part of the government can lead 
to unfortunate results and that better informed citizens can play a more 
active role in defending their respective countries. Given attitudes in the 
South Caucasus, providing more reliable coverage of international affairs 
is unlikely to discredit either of the regimes in Armenia or Azerbaijan and 
might even strengthen them. 
 
 
To the local and international NGO community and journalists 
 
Promote a Bottom up Approach to Journalistic Ethics 
This Eurasia Partnership Project seeks to address the urgent need for a 
voluntary code of ethics regulating journalistic behavior across the South 
Caucasus. Governments in democratic countries rarely succeed in 
imposing codes of behavior supported by the public.  
 
As witnessed in Paraguay, a better strategy is to take a bottom up 
approach that succeeds because journalistic integrity is generally 
demanded by the public. Moreover, market forces will be guided by ethical 
journalism if given a kick start.58 International donors and the NGO 
community can help fund and support media outlets and journalists 
adhering to certain ethical behavior until such a time that market forces 
take over. Training should take the form of sustained efforts over several 
months and not days or weeks, with proper feedback provided to 
journalists  about the type of product required.  
 
These trainings should aim to create media that: 
                                             
58 Ortega, B. (Winter, 2002). “Bringing Investigative Reporting to One of the Most 
Corrupt Countries in the World”. Knightline International, pg 42-45. Retrieved 
October 7, 2008, from http://www.knight.icfj.org/i/ortega.pdf 
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1. pays more attention to international news coverage and uses 
multiple sources, checks facts and provide adequate analysis 
especially in the case of television; 
2. refrains from inflammatory reporting; 
3. employs cheaper technological solutions to provide better 
international news coverage. 
 
To the donor community 
 
Embrace Web2.0 and the Technological Revolution 
As shown by greater respect for the Internet as a source for news and 
information, a more thoughtful approach to training on its use, as well as 
promoting use among the general population, should be employed. 
Indeed, the focus groups demonstrate that one of the most important ways 
to change media culture is to lay the basic foundations for the provision of 
high-speed Internet. This should be one of the main goals for the donor 
community and particularly for the MCC in Armenia. In addition, the donor 
community should: 
1. create cheap access to news through SMS technology or other 
mobile technology to people’s cell phones; 
2. work with mobile companies to lower the cost of online access to 
news websites via cell phones; 
3. provide enjoyable and free trainings for those who have never 
accessed the internet, particularly in rural communities. 
 
Train and promote a culture of ethical web journalists 
1. provide seed money to the best Armenian and Azerbaijani web 
news sources. An example of such a successful project is 
www.civil.ge in Georgia; 
2. ensure web journalists adhere to print media standards when 
publishing on the Internet. Eurasianet is an English and Russian 
language example of such a publication; 
3. use video streaming, blogging and hyper linking to create interactive 
websites; 
4. ensure web journalists publish an email address for an ombudsman 
who can consider any feedback or complaints seriously. 
 
To the research community  
 
Promote a Research Based Culture for Media Supporters and Providers 
 
Provide research to better target media development support.  
 
One reason for the failure of media development support programs has 
been their concentration on the print media when the majority of the 
population has neither access to or interest in newspapers. The same is 
true in Western countries and constantly conducting independent research 
to analyze public perceptions towards the media will greatly contribute to 
ensuring that international assistance in this area is more efficiently spent. 
 
Specific research project suggestions that have emerged out of this small 
scale research project include the need to: 
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1. conduct similar focus groups to those convened for this report in the 
regions of Armenia and Azerbaijan; 
2. further investigate the influence of the Turkish media in Azerbaijan; 
3. examine the currently most popular Armenian and Azerbaijani news 
sites, their provenance and news coverage processes.  
 
Train TV and other media outlets to conduct their own Market Research 
 
While for a need for market research has emerged in both Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, understanding how best to conduct it on a sufficient level is 
severely underdeveloped. Furthermore, most research is more concerned 
with branding and, to a certain extent, television ratings. No research has 
been undertaken for television stations to better understand how citizens 
view their channels. 
 
Trainings on how to conduct high level focus groups with television 
viewers is particularly recommended. 
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GLOSSARY OF MEDIA SOURCES  
ARMENIA 
Print media 
Hayastani Hanrapetutyun - daily, state-owned. 
Aravot – daily, private. 
Golos Armenii - private newspaper. 
Azg – daily, founded by Liberal Democratic Party. 
Iravunk - weekly, founded by Union of Constitutional Law party.  
Yerkir – weekly, founded by Armenian Revolutionary Federation-
Dashnaktsutyun, contains English-language pages.  
Haikakan Zhamanak - daily, founded by opposition Democratic Homeland 
Party.  
4th Ishkhanutyun – private, opposition oriented. 
 
Television 
H1 - From 2000 the National television was renamed into the Public 
television, and started using the "H1" logo.  
The channel has the largest broadcast area in Armenia. 
Shant TV - was founded by Arthur Yerzekyan in Gyumri, the second 
largest city of Armenia, in 1994. Currently it is one of the leading TV 
companies in Armenia and has nationwide coverage.  
Yerkir Media – private, is popular for its political talk shows.  
A1+ - was the most popular independent news channel until taken off the 
air in April 2002 by the Armenian government. Currently, the A1+ website 
provides daily news mainly on politics in Armenian, Russian, and English 
languages.  
Armenia TV - was the first private Armenian TV channel in Armenia and 
broadcasts a variety of programming including the latest news, 
entertainment, political and social talk shows, historical, cultural, children 
programs, movies and sports.  
ALM - private, on air since April 2002.  
 
Radio 
Azatutyun (Radio Liberty) Radio - Daily news, analyses and Real Audio 
broadcasts covering current events. 
Amerikayi Dzayn - The Voice of America, which first went on the air in 
1942, is a multimedia international broadcasting service funded by the 
U.S. Government through the Broadcasting Board of Governors.  
Public Radio of Armenia - national, state-run.  
News agencies  
Arka - private, English-language pages  
Armenpress - state-run, English-language pages  
Noyan Tapan - private, English-language pages  
Mediamax - private, English-language pages  
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Arminfo - private 
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AZERBAIJAN 
 
Print media 
Zerkalo, Echo – popular Russian-language independent newspapers. 
525 – Azeri-language independent newspaper. 
Xalq qazeti, Azerbaijan, Respublika – official state newspapers. 
Azadliq, Hurriyyet, Yeni Musavat, Bizim Yol and Yeni Zaman – 
opposition newspapers. 
 
Television  
Aztv - official state channel. The channel is popular in the regions, 
especially among old people.  
ANS (Azerbaijan News Services) - the first private channel in the country. 
The channel is mainly focused on political news. Among all TV channels, 
ANS offers comparatively more balanced coverage.  
Lider TV- was established in September, 2000 by Media Holding. The 
channel is the second biggest news channel after ANS in Azerbaijan. A 
pro-government channel, it takes an aggressive anti-opposition stance. It 
also focuses on entertainment, especially sport telecasting. 
ITV (Public TV) - was established in 2005 as one of the conditions of the 
European Council to the Azerbaijani government. The channel focuses 
mainly on public debates and programs, and tries to be neutral when 
dealing with government and opposition parties. 
ATV and Space TV - are focused on entertainment programs, especially 
music, show-business and movies.  
Xezer TV – a private channel, previously a Turkish channel, “Samanyolu”. 
Focuses on news, entertainment and music. 
Turkish CNN – available through satellite TV only. 
 
Radio  
BBC - broadcasts mainly news in English, Russian and Azeri. 
AZADLIQ (Radio Liberty) Radio - broadcasts in Azeri with some VOA 
insertions, is financed by the US Congress, offers independent news and 
analysis on political and social issues, and often raises debatable issues or  
presents alternative views.  
ANS-CM - owned by ANS Company, news and music oriented.  
 
News agencies  
Azartac - state-run, English-language pages  
Turan - private, English-language pages  
Trend - private, English-language pages  
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APPENDIX 1 
 METHODOLOGY 
CRRC Armenia and Azerbaijan offices conducted four focus groups in 
Yerevan and Baku, the capital cities of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Of those 
four, one was comprised of women under 40, one of women over 40, one 
of men under 40, and one of men over 40. CRRC recruited 20 people for 
each focus group to ensure the attendance of at least 10 participants.  
Recruiters selected participants by stopping pedestrians at sampling points 
selected by country directors (at least two points per city). The only 
selection criterion beyond the basic gender and age breakdown noted 
above was that the participants must consume news for at least one hour 
daily.  
CRRC Armenia faced challenges with the recruitment of focus group 
participants on the streets. One of the main reasons was the lack of trust 
from people stopped on the streets toward media. CRRC  2007 
respondent lists were used to select participants.  
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ANNEX 2 FOCUS GROUP SCHEDULE AND GROUP 
COMPOSITION  
Armenia 
• Male, 18-40 age group – 25 July, 2008 
¾ Group characteristics: 9 participants; average age of the 
participants 25.4; 5 students, 2 full-time employed, 2 part-
time employed.  
• Male, 40 and over age group – 26 July, 2008  
¾ Group characteristics: 8 participants; average age of the 
participants 59; 3 employed, 2 unemployed, 3 retired. 
• Female, 18-40 age group – 26, July, 2008 
¾ Group characteristics: 8 participants; average age of the 
participants 21; 6 students, 2 unemployed.  
• Female, 40 and over age group – 27, July, 2008 
¾ Group characteristics: 8 participants; average age of the 
participants 53.5; 5 unemployed, 3 employed.  
 
Azerbaijan 
• Male, 18-40 age group – 2 August, 2008 
¾ Group characteristics: 10 participants; average age of 
the participants 26.6; 6 employed, 3 unemployed, 1 
student.  
   
• Male, 40 and over age group – 2 August, 2008 
¾ Group characteristics: 6 participants; average age of 
the participants 54; 3 employed, 3 unemployed. 
 
• Female, 18-40 age group – 5 August, 2008 
¾ Group characteristics: 11 participants, average age of 
the participants 25; 7 employed, 3 unemployed, 1 
student. 
 
• Female, 40 and over age group - 4 August, 2008 
¾ Group characteristics: 11 participants; average age of 
the participants 44.4; 8 employed, 3 unemployed. 
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ANNEX 3 FOCUS GROUP GUIDE 
 
I. General International Coverage/Role of Media and Government 
 
1. What media sources inform you the most when it comes to 
international news? 
 
2. Does the national media provide satisfactory coverage of international 
stories and news? Is it of sufficient quality? 
 
[Prompt] How is the situation when it comes to foreign politics, 
economics/business and culture?]  
 
3. Which countries and regions should the media focus on? 
 
 [Follow up] What are the criteria to judge whether news in 
another country should be reported? 
 
4. What is an appropriate amount of time after an event occurs for it to be 
covered it in the media? Immediately, or after a certain amount of time? 
  
[For those who say “some amount of time”] How much time? 
 
5. Does the government have the right to regulate the media? 
 
6. Does the government have the right to control the media? 
 
7. Should journalists bear criminal responsibility for what they write? 
 
8. Do you think that there is more freedom of speech in Georgia or 
Armenia compared to Azerbaijan? 
 
9. In your opinion, do people consume different types of media depending 
on class and region? What kinds of people watch different television 
channels or read different newspapers? 
 
[Prompt for AZB]: ANS, AzTV, ATV, ITV, Lider, Space TV; Zerkalo/Ayna, 
Azadlig, Azerbaijan, Musavat, Xalq. 
 
 
II. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh-specific Coverage 
 
1. What is the media’s responsibility and role in reporting on the Nagorno 
Karabakh conflict? 
 
2. Should the media [Azerbaijani or Armenian] media report the national 
news of the other side in the conflict if it is unrelated to your own, or on 
Nagorno Karabakh? 
 
 [Prompt] For example, should it report on local political, 
economic, or cultural issues in Armenia or Azerbaijan? 
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3. How are the people from the other side in the Nagorno Karabakh 
conflict portrayed in the media? Are there stereotypes? Where do they 
come from? Are some of them true? 
 
4. How has media coverage of Armenia or Azerbaijan and Nagorno 
Karabakh changed over time? 
 
[Prompt for AZB] Is there any difference since the opening of BTC 
pipeline? 
 
 
III. Review of Clips/Article Summaries 
 
1. What do you think of this report?  
 
[Prompt] Is it complete? Is it objective? Is it biased?  
 
2. Is there any information which should have been included but was not?  
 
3. How do you feel when you watch/read this clip/article? 
 
 
IV. Accuracy/Bias 
 
1. Whose perspective and opinion should the media present? 
 
2. Should reporting be objective or subjective and include the opinion of 
the media producer? 
 
3. What is media accuracy? What is media bias? Can you think of 
examples of media bias in terms of sources and stories? 
 
4. Do you think media bias is a problem in your country [Armenia or 
Azerbaijan]? If so, why? What are the consequences? If not, why not? 
 
5. Do you think that the accuracy and bias of your media [Armenian or 
Azerbaijani] has changed over time? Has it improved, gotten worse or 
remained the same? 
 
 
V. Satisfaction/Trust 
 
1. Are you satisfied with media news coverage? 
 
2. How would you rate it on a scale of 1 to 10? 
 
[Prompt]: How do different types of media compare (i.e. TV vs. 
print media vs. radio vs. online). 
 
3. Which types of media do you trust most and why? 
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4. Which types of media don’t you trust and why? 
 
5. Which types of media do you trust most for reporting on Nagorno 
Karabakh? Which do you trust the least? Why? 
 
6. Which types of media do you trust most for reporting on your country’s 
[Armenia or Azerbaijan] national issues which are unrelated to Nagorno 
Karabakh? Which do you trust the least? Why? 
 
7. Do you believe information about Nagorno Karabakh and your country 
[Armenia or Azerbaijan] from government-controlled sources (official 
media bodies of government agencies)? 
 
8. Do you believe information about Nagorno Karabakh and your country 
[Armenia or Azerbaijan] from independent sources? 
 
9. Does conflict-related information, as broadcasted by government-
controlled sources (official media bodies of government agencies), 
generate patriotic feelings in you? 
 
10. In what ways could the media be improved so that you would trust it? 
 
11. Do you trust the media more or less than in the past? Why? 
 
[Prompt for AZB] Before and after 1993? Before and after 2003? 
Before and after 2005? 
